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by
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Organizations and conducted by the University of Illinois Institute of
Labor and Industrial Relations and Division of University Extension,
December 5, 195^, at Robert Allerton Park, Monticello, Illinois.)
In a speech I delivered at this very same Institute on
January h, 1957; I commented upon the fact that seventeen eventful
years had elapsed since Illinois began to pay benefits under its new
unemployment compensation law. I pointed out that, of course, no one
can predict what the evolution of the unemployment compensation system
will be in the next seventeen year period, but I assured my audience
that there will be changes. I am afraid that what I had in mind then
was merely that the Seventieth General Assembly was beginning its reg-
ular session, and that it was likely to consider the kinds of problems
in relation to unemployment compensation which had been before it in
prior sessions—the weekly benefit amount, specific proposals relative to
the eligibility and disqualification provisions of the law, and, possibly,
some changes in our experience rating formula.
In the background, of course, other problems existed, but they did
not appear to be immediate. Our unemployment compensation system had taken
the recessions of 19^+9-1950 and 195^-1955 in stride; I might even say with
flying colors. There was no reason to believe that a more severe test of
the capacity of our system to do its job was imminent. Nevertheless,
in 1952 and 1953 > ve had made a study of the financial structure of our
system. We were fully aware of the existence of certain weaknesses in that
structure. For one thing, the ratio of our reserve fund to taxable wages
was gradually contracting; in other words, the capacity of the fund to
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meet its potential benefit liability was gradually being reduced by the
steady rise in aggregate taxable payrolls. Secondly, the provisions of
our law for fund replenishment in the event of a period of unusually heavy
benefit payments appeared to be inadequate.
The results of the study were presented in detail to our Advisory
Board in 1953- In that year, the Eoard recommended corrective amendments
of the Unemployment Compensation Act, but they were not enacted into law.
At any rate, no one could foretell in January, 1957, that, a year
later, we would be in the midst of a recession more severe than the prior two
postwar recessions. During all of 1957, benefits paid to Illinois workers
had totaled $80,721,000. The total for only the first six months of
1958 was $115,000,000. The weekly number of beneficiaries during 1957
had been a little over 56,000; during the first half of 1958, this
weekly average was over 146,000. During 1957, we had paid benefits for
2.9 million weeks of unemployment; at the end of the sixth month of 1958,
3.8 million weeks had already been compensated. The reserve fund, which
had been in excess of $482,000,000 on June 30, 1957, had contracted to
$419,500,000 by June 30, 1958. As of September 30, 1958, it was down to
$379,629,000.
Our experience this year has brought a host of questions to the fore
relative to our program. Unemployment compensation is designed to insure
workers against the risk of losing their jobs and means of livelihood,
by replacing a part of the wages they have lost as a result of their
unemployment. Its role is not only the alleviation of the hardships which
befall individuals thrown out of work, but also that of helping to stem
the tide of recession by combating the contraction of community purchasing
power. Is the program doing its job effectively?
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Our State unemployment insurance systems provide benefits
for unemployed workers only for a limited period of time. Obviously,
benefits cannot be paid to a worker for a period of unlimited duration.
On the other hand, are the limits established by the Illinois law realistic?
Is the program doing its job effectively in this area?
I have already mentioned the fact that the fund reserved for the
payment of benefits has substantially contracted in size. What does the
future hold in store for the fund? What can be done to insure its
adequacy to meet its future liabilities?
TheBe are the questions I plan to examine today.
The Weekly Benefit Amount
When we think of the role of our program in replacing a part of the
wages lost by the worker who is out of work, and in helping to prevent undue
contraction of community purchasing power, the central problem is one of
the adequacy of the weekly benefit paid to unemployed workers. There are
a number of ways in which the adequacy of the weekly benefit can be
measured. But while we do the measuring, we must keep in mind that
unemployment compensation is intended to replace only a part of the wages
lost by the worker. The amount of the weekly benefit must, therefore, be
determined by a formula which establishes, for all beneficiaries, a uniform
relationship between benefits and prior earnings. While the size of the
weekly benefit for each beneficiary is determined by the amount of his
prior earnings and, therefore, varies from one person to the next, the
proportion of wage loss to be compensated is, normally, the same for all.
What the actual proportion of wage loss to be compensated should be
is, to a considerable degree, a matter of public policy. On the one hand,
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it is widely recognized that the proportion should not be so small as to
depress living standards unduly, or to require many beneficiaries to resort
to relief to supplement benefits. On the other hand, it is argued that
the proportion should not be so large as to threaten the beneficiary's
incentive to look for a job.
Back in 193** > the Committee on Economic Security created by Pres-
ident Roosevelt, whose report ultimately led to the enactment of the Social
Security Act and the State unemployment compensation laws, assumed a weekly
unemployment compensation benefit which would equal 50 Per cent of prior
weekly wages. While the basis for this assumption is not entirely clear, it
appears to have been an attempt to approximate that proportion of the wages
of workers which is normally used for ordinary living expenses which cannot
be deferred during periods of unemployment . These non-postponable ordinary
living expenses are, basically, those for food, rent, and utilities.
More recently, in 195^- and on other occasions, President
Eisenhower urged the States to overhaul their laws to achieve substantially
the standard recommended long ago by the Committee on Economic Security. But
the President was not concerned primarily with the benefit formulae
themselves. As a matter of fact, the overwhelming majority of the State
laws contain formulae which, if permitted to operate without limit, would
provide for all workers who had relatively full employment during their
base periods a benefit equal to at least 50 per cent of their prior average
weekly wages. The Illinois formula yields a benefit generally somewhat
higher than 50 per cent of the worker ' s prior average weekly wage
.
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However, no State permits its formula to operate without limits.
The most important of these limits is the statutory ceiling on the weekly
benefit. No one may receive a weekly benefit in excess of this ceiling,
regardless of the amount of his prior average weekly wage.
The imposition of a statutory ceiling on the weekly benefit is based
on the theory that a worker who earns $300 a week should not get $150 a
week in benefits. But the ceiling also creates the danger that, in a
period of rising price and wage levels, it will remain stationary, or,
at best, it will more upward too slowly. As a result, with the passage of
time and the increase in price and wage levels, the benefit formula operates
less and less effectively. More and more workers bump against the
statutory ceiling and their weekly benefit is smaller than the proportion
of wage loss which the benefit formula says they ought to get. To put it
another way, fewer and fewer workers receive a weekly benefit which enables
them to buy non-postponable necessities during periods of unemployment.
The danger I have spoken of has become an actuality. Although the
States have acted from time to time to raise the ceilings on the weekly
benefit, the rate of these increases has lagged behind that of prices and
wages. This is what the President was concerned with when he urged the
States to return to the standard set by the Committee on Economic Security.
Specifically, he asked the States to raise their ceilings to a sufficiently
high level to permit the great majority of the beneficiaries to qualify
for a weekly benefit equal to at least half their prior earnings. While
many States responded to his plea by raising their ceilings, most of them
still have a long way to go to reach the goal he suggested.
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Here in I-linois, if you look at the number of times the ceiling
has been raised since The Unemployment Compensation Act became law, you
may be impressed by the fact that it has, actually, been steadily rising.
In July 1939, when benefit payments first began, it was $16. Effective
in 19^2, it was raised to $18; two years later, to $20. In 1950, the
maximum became $25; in 1952, $27. Effective with 1956, Illinois adopted
a system of variable maximum weekly benefit amounts, based on the number
of the beneficiary's specified dependents. To reach any of the prescribed
ceilings, the beneficiary must still have been paid sufficient wages,
under the benefit formula, in a specified prior calendar quarter. Under
the new system, the maximum possible weekly benefit for a person without
the specified dependents was $28; it went up, at $3 intervals, with the
number of dependents, to a top of $40, payable to a person with four or
more dependent children.
In 1957* the maximum possible weekly benefit was raised to $30 for a
person without the specified dependents. For a person who has a dependent,
non-working spouse, the weekly benefit can reach a top of $33 > for one with
a dependent child, it can reach $36; for one with two such children, $39;
with three such children, $42; and with four or more dependent children, $^5»
Now, $45 sounds like an adequate weekly benefit. However, only
persons who have four dependent children can qualify for it if they have suf-
ficient prior wages. Figures for the second quarter of 1958 tell an inter-
esting story in this connection. More than 3 out of 5 of our beneficiaries
(61.6 per cent) during that calendar quarter had no dependent spouse or child.
The ceiling on the weekly benefit for them was $30, no matter how high their
prior wages were. Less than 1 out of 12 of our beneficiaries (7-8 per cent)
had a dependent spouse; 1 out of 8 of our beneficiaries (12.3 per cent) had
-6-

a dependent child. Not quite 1 beneficiary out of 10 (9-2 per cent of the
beneficiaries) had two dependent children. Only 5*1 per cent had three
dependent children; and only 3-9 per cent could qualify for the highest
ceiling of $45 because they did have four dependent children.
A significant fact about our program is that the vast majority of our
beneficiaries now qualify for the maximum weekly benefit applicable to
them. Thus, during the last quarter of 1957* 84.4 per cent of the bene-
ficiaries without dependents qualified for the maximum weekly benefit of $30.
When more than 4 out of 5 beneficiaries qualify for the maximum, it is a good
indication that their prior average weekly wages were sufficiently high to
have qualified them for a higher weekly benefit under the benefit formula
if its operation had not been limited by the statutory maximum. It must
be concluded that their weekly benefit constituted an inadequate
replacement of the wages they lost as a result of their unemployment.
There is another way of measuring the adequacy of the weekly benefit.
In 1939 > average weekly wages of Illinois workers covered by The Unemployment
Compensation Act were $29«27. In 1940, the maximum possible weekly benefit
was $16. Thus, the statutory maximum in 1940 equaled more than half the
prior average weekly wages of covered workers in the State.
On the other hand, average weekly wages of Illinois workers covered
by The Unemployment Compensation Act in 1957 were $93*62. In 1958 > "the
highest possible weekly benefit for 3 out of 5 workers was $30, or less than
one-third of prior average weekly wages of covered workers in the State.
Even the highest ceiling of $45, available to the less than 4 per cent of
the beneficiaries who had four dependent children, was less than half
the prior average weekly wage in the State.
-7-

The same comparisons could be made with the increase of the
cost of living. Although wages have increased faster than the cost of
living, the weekly benefit has lagged far behind the increase in the
cost of living.
I have spent some time analyzing the Illinois maximum weekly benefit
to indicate that it presents a basic problem. If the weekly benefit should
be 50 Per cent of prior average weekly wages for the great majority of
beneficiaries, as indicated by President Eisenhower, Illinois has fallen
somewhat short of the goal. I should like to point out, however, that the
same is true of most of the other States. In only nine States does the
statutory ceiling on the weekly benefit equal or exceed 50 P©** cent of the
State's prior average weekly wage.
It is true, however, that, in the last quarter of 1957, the $30 ceil-
ing on the weekly benefit in Illinois equaled only 33-2 per cent of the State's
1956 average weekly wages of covered workers. Only in Michigan and Alaska
was the proportion even lower. It is also true that, at this time, the
maximum weekly benefit in 32 States is higher than the $30 first ceiling
in Illinois. In four States, it is $32; in four others, including Ohio and
Indiana, it is $33; in two, it is $3^; and in nine, including Massachusetts,
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, it is $35- Four other States have maximum
weekly benefits of $36, $37-50, $38 and $39, respectively. The basic
maximum weekly benefit is $^0 in five additional States, including
California; and it is $^2 in Wisconsin, $^3 in Wyoming, and $45 in New York
and Alaska.
Benefit Duration
Unemployment Compensation has generally been regarded as a program
designed to provide protection against short duration unemployment.
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If the duration of an individual's unemployment stretched beyond a period
considered to he ample enough for most workers to find new jobs, his
problem was regarded as beyond the scope of unemployment compensation and
there was vague reference to the need for some other program to which he
might look for help.
Initially, no State provided for a duration of benefits longer than
16 weeks. As the years passed, the trend toward a longer period of
protection led to the point at which 26 weeks became the generally
accepted standard of maximum benefit duration. Now 30 States, including
Illinois, have 26 weeks of maximum duration. Wisconsin provides for 26^-
weeks, Louisiana for 28 weeks, and Pennsylvania for 30 weeks.
In the first two months of 1958, 292,000 persons in the United States
exhausted their regular unemployment compensation benefits. By the end
of April, the number of exhaustees had risen to 713 > 000. As early as
that month, it was already being estimated that 2,600,000 workers in the
United States would exhaust their regular benefits during 1958.
Ant i -recession bills were introduced in Congress by the dozen. During
February and March, more than two dozen bills were introduced relating to
unemployment compensation alone. The most far-reaching bill was that
introduced by Senator Kennedy for himself and 17 other Senators. Among
its many provisions, was one which would have required Federal grants to
the States for emergency supplementation of State weekly benefits, as well
as for the payment of extended benefits to unemployment compensation
beneficiaries for a uniform 39 weeks. Moreover, the bill would have
required the States to amend their laws to raise the ceilings on their
weekly benefit amounts and to provide for uniform benefit duration of 39
weeks, beginning July 1, 1959.

As the weeks passed, it became clear that the Congress was primarily
concerned with the fact that the mass unemployment caused by the recession
was lasting beyond the periods of benefit duration provided for by the
State unemployment compensation laws. In other words, the recession had
put into question the adequacy of the duration standards in effect in the
States, and had created the immediate problem of providing protection for
the rapidly growing number of those who had exhausted their regular benefits.
The approach in Congress was that this was an emergency which required
immediate remedial action. This was also the primary concern of the
national administration.
The result, as you know, was the enactment of the Federal Temporary
Unemployment Compensation Act of 1958 • It became law, upon the President's
approval, on June k, 1958. It provides that any State which wishes to do
so may enter into an agreement with the Federal Government whereby the
latter advances funds to the State to defray the cost of extended benefit
payments to those who exhausted their regular State benefits and have no
other benefit rights. Under the agreement, an exhaustee who is otherwise
eligible for benefits is paid the same weekly benefit as he had before he
exhausted his regular benefits; the duration of the extended benefits
equals half the duration of his exhausted regular benefits. The Federal
program automatically lapses after the week beginning March 31 > 1959*
Under the Federal Act, the advances made to any State which
participates in the program must be restored to the Federal Government.
If the State does not do so by the end of 1962, either from its general
funds or from its fund reserved for the payment of benefits, then,
beginning with 19&3, the effective Federal Unemployment Tax levied upon
employers in that State will go up from the present 0.3 per cent to
-10-
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0.45 per cent; for 196k, if a balance is still due from the State, the
tax will go up to 0.6 per cent; for 1965 it will rise to 0.75 per cent, and
so on, until the full balance due is restored.
As of now, seventeen States, including 7 major industrial States,
participate fully in the Federal program. Five additional States,
including Illinois, and Ohio, have established their own programs for
paying extended benefits.
In Illinois, exhaustions of regular benefits during the early part
of 1958 jumped dramatically from one month to the next. In January, the
number of exhaustees was 6,760; in February, it was over 7,000; in March,
it was 9,000; in April, 13,000; and in May, over 15,000. Governor
Stratton decided that the problem required legislative action, and, as
you know, he convened a special session of the General Assembly on
June 16, 1958, for the purpose. Following the Governor's expressed
preference for independent State action on the problem, the General Assembly
enacted an amendment of The Unemployment Compensation Act, providing for
the payment of temporary emergency benefits from the Illinois reserve fund.
The Governor approved the bill on June 20, 1958, and it became fully
effective on July 1.
Under the new amendment, temporary emergency benefits are payable to
those who exhausted their regular benefits after November 30, 1957, did
not have any other benefit rights, and are otherwise eligible for benefits.
An exhaustee's weekly benefit is the same as his last regular weekly
benefit, and the duration of his temporary emergency benefits cannot exceed
half the duration of his prior regular benefits. Like the Federal
program, the Illinois program of temporary emergency benefits automatically
lapses after the week beginning March 31, 1959-
11- UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

I can give you four figures which may indicate the importance of
the temporary emergency benefits program. Between December 1, 1957, and
October 31 > 1958 > 13^,500 persons exhausted their regular Illinois benefits.
During the first four months of the program (between July 1 and October 31)*
83,850 of them received temporary emergency benefits totaling $19,580,000.
During the same four months, Illinois benefits paid to regular beneficiaries
totaled $56,100,000. As you can see, temporary emergency benefits equaled
more than one-third of the regular 'benefits paid during the same period.
It is obvious that temporary emergency benefits are performing an important
role both in protecting individuals still out of work, and in maintaining
purchasing power in the State.
Both the Federal and the Illinois emergency programs will lapse
in another four months. How serious a gap will they leave? It is, of
course, difficult to tell. Our economy has obviously been on the upgrade, but
the volume of unemployment is still relatively high. The problem in Illinois
is of an immediate nature, because Governor Stratton has expressed his
expectation that the Board of Unemployment Compensation and Free Employment
Office Advisors will make recommendations on the subject to him and to the
Seventy-First General Assembly which convenes in January.
There is a considerable body of opinion that the current duration
standard of 26 weeks for regular benefits is inadequate. The enactment
of temporary emergency benefit programs to combat the effects of the long
duration unemployment caused by the current recession is suggestive of
the direction which the program may take in the future.
I am confident that much thought is being given throughout the
country today to ways and means of filling the vacuum when the Federal
and State temporary emergency benefit programs expire at the end of March.
12-
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Now that a precedent has been created by the establishment of these programs,
thought is no doubt being given to permanent statutory provisions for
programs of extended duration which would automatically go into effect when
the volume and duration of unemployment rise beyond some specified point.
Certainly, if provisions for extended benefits are deemed necessary in
periods of emergency, it is better to have them in the laws, ready for use,
than to rely upon special Congressional and legislative action when the
emergency is already upon us. It will be interesting to see to what
extent the States will act to insert such provisions in their laws, and
what form these provisions will take.
Fund Adequacy
I have already mentioned the fact that the Illinois reserve fund has
been edging downward since the beginning of the recession. It was more
than $100,000,000 smaller at the end of September than it had been fifteen
months earlier. Our estimates show that the downward trend is likely to
continue
.
As of last June 30, the fund stood at $^19,500,000. During the year
which will end next June 30, we expect an income of about $7^,100,000, of
which $64,900,000 will be in the form of contributions from employers
subject to the law, and $9,200,000 will be interest on our fund. However,
we expect to pay out, between last July 1 and next June 30, a total of
$215,600,000 in benefits. Of this sum, $176,800,000 will be the payments
under the regular program, and $38,800,000 will be those under the temporary
emergency benefit program which will lapse at the end of March. That means
that the balance in the fund on June 30, 1959, will be down to an estimated
$278,000,000.
-13-
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If our estimates are correct -- and I have no reason to doubt them -
it is obvious that action must be taken to insure adequate fund replenishment.
Before I discuss replenishment, however, I should like to point out
not only that the situation in Illinois is not unique, but that some other
industrial States are, right now, in serious financial plight. As of
August 31> 1958> when the Illinois fund was 5-1 per cent of its taxable
wages, the Rhode Island fund was down to 3*8 per cent of its taxable
wages. Delaware was down to 2-5 per cent of its taxable wages. Pennsylvania
was down to 2.3 per cent. Michigan was not only down to 2.3 per cent of its
taxable wages, but it has had to borrow $113,000,000 from the Federal
Government to replenish its fund. (Pennsylvania would have borrowed, also,
except that it had no authorization to do so under its own law. ) Alaska
and Oregon are also in financial difficulties.
However, the fact that Illinois has not reached the point of fund
insolvency should not lead to complacency. The ratio of the Illinois fund
to taxable wages, which is one of the best indicators of the potential
benefit liability of the fund, has been steadily contracting, and will
continue to do so under our present law. We estimate that the average
contribution rate for 1959 > based upon our present statutory experience
rating formula, will be in the neighborhood of 1 per cent of wages, as
compared with the average estimated rate of 0.77 per cent for 1958. It is
clear that, if we are to assure fund replenishment, employers will have to
contribute at a substantially higher rate in i960. In order to secure
such replenishment, however, legislative action in 1959 will be necessary.
I might observe that, unless such action is taken, Illinois may, some time
after June 30, 1959> become eligible to join Michigan in borrowing Federal
funds to keep going. These borrowed funds would ultimately have to be
-14-

restored to the Federal Government, either by the State itself, or through
increases in the Federal Unemployment Tax payable by Illinois employers. I
am sure that all interested groups in Illinois would prefer that we solve
our financial problem without resort to the Federal loan fund.
There are several ways in which substantially higher contributions
income in i960 can be assured. All of them are under consideration.
Whether some or all will find their way into the law in 1959> or what form
they will take if they do become law, is in the laps of the gods.
One way to produce additional income to the fund is to broaden the
tax base. As you know, contributions are now payable only on the first
$3,000 of the wages paid to a worker by an employer in a calendar year.
This $3,000 limitation was established by the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act in 1939, and under the Illinois Act in 19^0. All the States placed the
limitation in their laws to conform with the Federal Act. At that time,
relatively few workers had earnings in a year in excess of $3,000. Today,
on the other hand, $3,000 is no longer high enough a ceiling in relation
to workers' annual wages. Five States have already recognized this fact
and have amended their unemployment compensation laws to broaden the tax
base to $3,600. In Alaska, the tax base is $4,200. Over the years the
Federal Insurance Contributions Act has been amended several times to
broaden its tax base, for old age, survivors, and disability insurance
purposes, from $3,000 to $3,600, to $4,200, and, effective with 1959, to $4,800,
There is an important body of opinion that the $3,000 limitation in
the Illinois law is outdated and that the time has come to raise it. I
might interject at this point that the pressure for raising the $3,000
wage base under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act is also increasing. As
you know, the Federal tax equals 3 per cent of the first $3,000 of wages
paid to a worker in a calendar year. Against this tax, an employer who pays
-15-

contributions under a State unemployment compensation lav may offset the
amount of such contributions, up to 90 per cent of the tax. Thus, the
Federal Government's tax receipts are 0.3 per cent of wages. The cost
of administering the State employment security systems and the Federal
functions relating to employment security are financed from these receipts.
Over the years, administrative costs have been rising to the point where the
tax receipts will soon be insufficient to finance them. It is likely,
therefore, that Congress may act either to increase the tax or to broaden
the tax base. If it does the latter, Illinois will automatically do so,
too, because of a provision in the Illinois Act that the term "wages" includes
any remuneration defined as "wages" under the Federal Act.
Another way to produce additional income to the Illinois fund is
to raise the top variable contribution rate from the present 3-25 per cent
to some higher level. There are a number of employers in Illinois whose
experience with the risk of unemployment is so adverse that, were it not
for the statutory maximum contribution rate, they would be contributing
at substantially higher rates. It is argued by those who advocate a
maximum contribution rate higher than 3-25 per cent that these high risk
employers are not carrying their full burden of the cost of unemployment.
A third possible change which would lead toward fund solvency would
look to a revision in the replenishment formula in our law. At present
the Act sets maximum and minimum limits for the fund at absolute
dollar figures, rather than percentages of the taxable payroll, and
calls for adjustment in rates when the fund falls below or exceeds these
limits. These limits have no relationship to any measure of the benefit
liability or financial adequacy of the fund. It is obvious, for example,
that the stated minimum of $290,000,000 is unrealistic in the light of the
estimate that, in the 12 months which will end next June 30 > an estimated
$215,600,000 will be paid out in benefits.
-16-
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To be realistic, we believe the maximum and minimum amounts should
have some relationship to taxable wages. If the minimum amount, for
example, were stated as a specified percentage of taxable wages, and if
that percentage were set at a level high enough to insure that substantial
rate increases would begin, and fund replenishment start, while the fund still
has enough money to meet its potential benefit liability for a reasonable
period of time, the fund would be sufficiently strengthened to withstand
the blow of recession unemployment. It is important to note, however,
that such a change in the law in 1959 would result in truly substantial
increases in contribution rates for Illinois employers in i960.
As I have already said, all of the methods of fund replenishment I
have outlined to you are being avidly discussed by interested groups. I
have only one observation to make, and that is that whatever the result
may be, some change in the law is essential and, I believe, inevitable
if the Illinois reserve fund is to be prevented from falling into great
danger
.
The title of my talk was "Unemployment Compensation in Illinois:
Current Problems and Future Prospects." I have spoken of the weekly benefit
amount, of extended benefit duration, and of reserve fund adequacy. These
three subjects appear to me to be currently the most important aspects of
our unemployment compensation program. The events of the next biennium which
bear upon them will, I believe, shape the entire program and the degree
of its effectiveness both as insurance and as a first line of defense against
economic adversity, for years to come.
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